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Abstract 
One of the biggest problems with the Internet 
technology is the unwanted spam emails. The well-
disguised phishing email comes in as part of the 
spam and makes its entry into one’s inbox quite 
frequently nowadays. While phishing is normally 
considered a consumer issue, the fraudulent tactics 
the phishers use are now intimidating the corporate 
sector as well. In this paper, we analyze the various 
aspects of phishing attacks and draw on some 
possible defenses as countermeasures. We initially 
address the different forms of phishing attacks in 
theory, and then look at some examples of attacks 
in practice, along with their common defenses. We 
also highlight some recent statistical data on 
phishing scam to project the seriousness of the 
problem. Finally, some specific phishing 
countermeasures at both the user level and the 
organization level are listed, and a multi-layered 
anti-phishing proposal is presented to round up our 
studies. 
 
1. Introduction 
As technology advances, the Internet along with 
email has become an integral part of one’s life. 
Unfortunately, the flexibility provided by the 
advancement of technology has at the same time 
resulted in criminals following the trend. Many 
problems thus arise, and one of such is the identity 
theft. Recently, one form of identity theft crime 
that has become a lethal security threat is phishing, 
targeted primarily at the casual email users. 
Phishing is the act of sending forged emails and 
fake websites to users in an attempt to scam them 
into surrendering personal information that leads to 
identity theft [1]. Typical phishing email is sent to 
many potential victim’s mailboxes, and usually 
comes with a clickable link. It is meant to lure the 
recipient to trust that the email received is from a 
trusted source so that the recipient will open and 
click on the provided website hyperlink which 
connects them to some fake websites, and 
eventually extracting personal information from 
them. The phishers (attackers) may use deceptive 
sender address, genuine-looking logo and 
fraudulent web links in such emails. In the battle 
against phishing, we would like to emphasize the 
fact that user education is important, as ignorant 
users can get themselves into troubles even with 
the best and most sophisticated defenses available.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 explains the different types of phishing 
attacks in theory. Following which, section 3 
discusses some examples of phishing attacks as 
well as their corresponding defenses in practice. 
Section 4 shows some recent statistical details on the 
phishing scams. Section 5 explains on specific 
countermeasures and section 6 presents a multi-
layered anti-phishing proposal. Finally, section 7 
concludes this paper with summary and remarks. 
2. Types of Phishing Attacks 
Phishing attacks target mostly on confidential 
information such as user names, passwords, social 
security numbers, passport numbers, credit card 
numbers, bank account numbers, PIN numbers, 
birthdates, mother’s maiden names, etc. Phishers can 
easily focus on the technology expertise and sit in the 
comfort of their homes or hack offices to get 
sensitive information at their fingertips. In this 
section, we would like to discuss several types of 
phishing attacks as listed below, which were 
discussed by Emigh [2]: 
 
1. Phishing Attack by Fraud, where the user is 
fooled by fraudulent emails to disclose personal or 
confidential information. 
2. Phishing Attack by Infectious software, where the 
attacker succeeds in running dangerous software on 
user’s computer. 
3. Phishing Attack by DNS spoofing, where the 
attacker compromises the domain lookup process so 
that the user’s click would lead him or her to a fake 
website. 
4. Phishing Attack by Inserting harmful content, 
where the attacker puts malicious content into a 
normal website. 
5. Phishing Attack by MITM approach, where the 
attacker gets in between the user and the legitimate 
site and taps sensitive information. 
6. Phishing Attack by Search Engine indexing, 
where the fake web pages with attractive offers 
created by the attacker gets indexed by a search 
engine, so that a user would stumble upon it. 
 
In phishing attack by fraud, the attacker sends a fraud 
email demanding the user to take some action, 
normally by citing a problem with his bank account, 
advertising a new service roll-out, or offering 
fictitious invoice, etc. In all the above cases, the user 
is directed to a website where one’s personal or 
sensitive information is being extracted. The attacker 
may use a link with a domain name that looks very 
similar to the original domain name. If responded 
positively, this can lead to malicious software being 
installed on the user’s computer which leaves an 
open back door for future attacks. In phishing attack 
by infectious software, the attacker takes advantage 
of security vulnerabilities with the computer or the 
operating system. Often, it happens by luring the user 
to open an email attachment with promise of 
pornographic images or other interesting baits. 
Some freely downloadable software also contains 
infectious programs that get installed along with 
the original software. Keyloggers are stealth 
programs that can be installed into a web browser 
and/or work as device driver that captures the data 
that is keyed in by the user and sent to a remote 
server setup by the attacker. Session hijacking can 
also happen through a malicious browser 
component that was installed by the attacker. When 
the user logs in to do a transaction, the infectious 
software hijacks that session and does malicious 
activity once the user credentials are proved to be 
right with the transacting website. Web Trojans 
that pop up to collect user credentials and channel 
them back to the attacker are also prevalent 
nowadays. In phishing attacks by DNS spoofing, 
the DNS lookup process is compromised either on 
the local computer or the DNS server. Hosts file in 
a local computer is looked into first before 
querying a DNS server to find the IP address to 
domain mapping when a link is clicked or when a 
domain address is entered in the browser. If this 
file is compromised and false mapping is entered in 
hosts file through malicious software, the user can 
ignorantly go to the attacker’s website and give 
personal information. A Crowt.D worm attack in 
year 2005 was doing this. System configuration 
altering attacks can be done to compromise the 
DNS server, so that the mapping is poisoned. In 
phishing attacks by inserting harmful content, the 
attacker can compromise a server’s security 
vulnerability and put malicious or harmful content 
instead of legitimate one, such as the cross-site 
scripting (XSS) vulnerability. Here content coming 
from external sources like chat message, search 
item or web email would be supplied to the 
visitor’s web browser. SQL injection vulnerability 
can also be used to perform malicious actions. 
Fig 1. Stages in a Phishing attack  
 
In phishing attacks by MITM approach, the 
attacker intercepts user traffic by standing between 
him and the website. He uses proper response 
forwarding mechanism as the user communicates 
with the intended site and helps communication 
back to the user from the website – all through his 
computer. The user thus can have no suspicion on 
traffic tapping. In phishing attacks by search engine 
indexing, the attacker creates genuine-looking 
website for fake products where he has options to 
perform financial transactions and attract users 
because of better offers than others. This website 
would then be submitted for indexing by search 
engines, so that any user can get a hit on the 
attacker’s webpage. Fraudulent banks with higher 
interest rates can attract customers in such a scenario 
and make the users to perform some cash transfer to 
the newly created account in the attacker’s web trap 
[2]. The stages of a general phishing attack are 
summarized in figure 1. 
 
3. Examples of Phishing Attacks and Defenses 
In this section, we describe the technical aspects of 
typical phishing attacks based on Beardsley’s paper 
[1]. Four common techniques are discussed, namely 
email field manipulation, email with image-only 
content, misdirection and redirection, and pop-up 
window attack. The first two techniques, email field 
manipulation and email with image-only content, can 
be categorized under type 1 to 3 as discussed in the 
previous section. Meanwhile, misdirection and 
redirection as well as pop-up window attack can be 
categorized under type 1 to 6. We have also briefly 
outlined the corresponding defenses that could 
prevent the phishing expedition and protect 
consumers from the online fraud 
 
Attack 1: Email Field Manipulation attack 
One of the most common phishing techniques comes 
in forging the email headers. As most of the email 
client software depends heavily on the message’s 
From field to determine a sender, many phishing 
emails simply forge the From message’s header. It is 
quick and literally requires no tough effort to forge 
the From field, and the technique of doing so is 
widely known since the 1980s. A forged From field 
can easily be configured on an SMTP server that 
allows the use of it without authentication. To make 
the matter worse, some anti-spam client applications 
even allow the use of emails that merely match the 
From patterns, thus bypassing the last line of anti-
spam defense. Recently, more sophisticated phishing 
emails alter not just the From field but the Received 
path headers too [1]. In figure 2, the E-mail header of 
a phishing email from phisher@hotmail.com 
(Phisher) to victim_user@target.com (Victim User) 
disguised as clean_user@yahoo.com (Clean User) is 
shown. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Return-Path: <phisher@hotmail.com> 
Received: from hotmail.com (bay20-dav5.bay20. 
hotmail.com [64.4.54.185]) by target.com 
(8.12.11.20060308/8.12.11) with SMTP id 
k4L8ighF012529 for <victim_user@target.com>; 
Sun, 21 May 2006 16:44:43 +0800 
Received: from mail pickup service by hotmail.com 
with Microsoft SMTPSVC; Sun, 21 May 2006  
Message-ID: <BAY20-DAV5625D82C250389FF8 
32A8B0A50@phx.gbl> 
Received: from 60.1.120.150 by BAY20-
DAV5.phx.gbl with DAV; Sun, 21 May 2006  
X-Originating-IP: [60.1.120.150] 
X-Originating-Email: [phisher@hotmail.com] 
X-Sender: phisher@hotmail.com 
Reply-To: <clean_user@yahoo.com> 
From: "Clean User" <clean_user@yahoo.com> 
To: "Victim User" <victim_user@target.com> 
Subject: Great news ... Click the link 
Date: Sun, 21 May 2006 17:02:38 +0800 
X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fig 2. The E-mail header of a phishing email from 
Hotmail Server 
 
We have used the hotmail SMTP server to perform 
the attack above. It was easily configured on MS 
Outlook. As hotmail’s SMTP server does not use 
any kind of authentication, the phisher can disguise 
himself as virtually “anyone” to send phishing 
email to the victim user. If he disguises himself as 
the CEO or Manager of an organization and sends 
emails requesting for some personal information 
from the employees of the organization (with or 
without a forged web link), it would become an 
ultimate attack where every sincere employee 
would give out information to their boss! It is true 
that the header of such emails can reveal 
information that is suspicious as shown in figure 2, 
but the problem is how many people will actually 
check the header of an email? A more effective 
disguised attack can be done using free Mass 
eMailer ver.2.2 software or other similar ones, as 
shown in figure 3. 
 
Fig 3.  The Mass eMailer 2.2 software that can be 
used for sending mass mails with forged identity 
 
Common Defense: Before we mention about the 
defense on forging fields in email attack, it is 
necessary to note that a phishing email received in 
general goes through a path that differs from a 
regular email slightly. It takes a detour from a trusted 
financial institution to some home broadband 
machine, and then finally arrives at the user’s mail 
server. Hence, the user will see only the trustworthy 
Received header as it is the last hop before a trusted 
mail server. Although there is no sound 
authentication to tackle the forging of From fields, 
still certain tracks can be followed to sniff a forgery. 
As phishers use some random portions of the name 
and subject of the email message, the presence of 
strange spacing and characters may flag a phishing 
message. The combination of hash-busting characters 
with particular brand strings gives a strong indication 
that the email carries malicious intent. By comparing 
the timestamps included in Received headers, the 
more sophisticated forging emails can also be 
detected. If the Received chain is crafted, the time 
zones are normally blank, or the timestamps not 
contiguous.  
 
Attack 2: Email with Image-only Content attack 
Another common phishing technique is called the 
image insertion attack in emails [1]. It is a situation 
where the phishing emails contain only binary 
images, such as the .GIF pictures, in an HTML-
capable mail client. The purpose is to supply a text 
stream of random words and phrases to confuse spam 
filters, thus bypassing them. Common Defense: The 
most straight forward solution for the image insertion 
attack is obviously to allow only the plain-text emails 
and disable HTML-based messages. However, we 
reckon that graphical appearance is one of the 
significant features the Internet users are expecting. 
As such, some more creative prevention is necessary 
for commercial purposes. Instead of totally 
disallowing the HTML-based emails, an alternative 
can be provided for the email users to choose 
between plain-text and HTML. If a certain email 
looks suspicious, the email user can always opt for 
the plain-text version to avoid being snared into 
some fraudulent web links.  
 
Attack 3: Misdirection and Redirection attack 
The misdirection and redirection attack is considered 
by many as one of the most creative phishing 
techniques. This attack misdirects the users through 
emailed URLs to fraudulent sites [1], [3]. One of the 
simplest ways to misdirect email users to unreliable 
sites is through the crafted links that can be generated 
automatically. Most of the mail clients available in 
the market nowadays instinctively convert plain-text 
http links into clickable URLs. The rendering link 
may appear to be a familiar-looking link such as 
https://logon.rhbbank.com.my/ with added security 
measure due to the apparent use of https, but in 
actual fact it is a mere illusion that misdirects the 
users to another site over http. For instance, <a 
href=“http://192.9.200.1”>https://logon.rhbbank.com
.my/</a> will direct a user to an unknown site with 
IP address of http://192.9.200.1 instead of the trusted 
https site, even though the URL appears to the user is 
a familiar-looking web link like 
https://logon.rhbbank.com.my/. Phishers also use 
overlapping area map tags to intersect two links in 
same clickable area within the phishing email. 
While the hovering link appears to be normal, it 
actually takes the user to the hidden link. Apart 
from the misdirection tactics, recently many 
phishers have been making full use of the available 
technologies and services offered by various well-
known vendors or sources to redirect email users to 
some nested links [1].  
 
Among other redirection tactics, some phishing 
emails are using the address obfuscation service to 
provide a shorter version clickable link in the email 
based on purposefully generated long URL. With 
this, the phishers are hoping that the email users 
will try the shorter URL rather than the longer one, 
and in turn will lead the users to the phisher’s sites. 
The address obfuscation service is ideal for the 
phishers to hide chained redirects. Two other 
services that have become the phishers’ 
instruments to perform identity theft are the free 
DNS redirectors and the embedded html forms. In 
free DNS redirectors, the phishers have plenty of 
ground to resolve the IP addresses to the chosen 
DNS names transparent to the email users. This can 
easily obfuscate the users to click on the fraudulent 
links. Meanwhile, embedded html forms are 
normally embedded within a phishing email, 
together with a typical call-to-action that requires 
the user to verify his or her account activity. This 
substitutes the requirement for the phishers to use a 
live Web server to extract user’s private 
information. Common Defense: Fencing off 
phishing emails consisting of encoded or 
redirection tricks can be very straight forward with 
several easy-to-implement anti-phishing rules such 
as no hex-encoded printable ASCII characters in 
domain names, no HTTP link containing ‘http’ 
more than once and no nested <A> and <AREA> 
links [1]. The redirection with address obfuscation 
service, however, is more difficult to combat due to 
the fact that it is not strongly associated with 
phishing activities. By performing a matching and 
blocking based on the From header of known 
financial institutions with their URLs may be a way 
to tackle it. 
 
Attack 4: Pop-up window attack 
Pop-up login screens are used extensively by some 
of the commercial banks to perform basic login and 
customer tracking functions. However, in order for 
the users to login to their personal accounts, they 
have to disable the pop-up blocker provided by the 
Internet browser. In such situation, the phisher’s 
site can immediately spawn two pop-up windows 
once the login is connected, with one window 
showing the real site, and the other the phisher’s 
own pop-up window that asks only for identity 
information. Common Defense: User education is 
the best approach here, where the users can be 
advised to be alert to unexpected pop-ups, which 
can ‘look’ slightly different from the normal. 
 
4. Phishing Scam Statistics and Analysis 
The summary of Phishing Activity Trends Report 
(March 2006) by Anti-Phishing Working group 
(APWG) as given in [4] is shown in figure 4 below. 
The monthly Phishing Activity Trends Report 
analyzes the phishing attacks reported to the APWG 
through the website at http://www.antiphishing.org 
or through user email submission to APWG’s email 
at reportphishing@antiphishing.org. The APWG 
phishing attack repository is quite revealing in terms 
of email fraud and phishing activity. The summary of 
findings in figure 4 indicates that phishing is a 
serious problem that is growing vigorously. The total 
number of unique phishing reports submitted to 
APWG in March 2006 was 18,480 – the highest 
recorded figure (see figure 5). Most phishing attacks 
and new phishing sites also occurred in the same 
month. The total number of unique phishing websites 
recorded by APWG in March 2006 was 9666, which 
is a continual increase since January 2006. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of unique phishing reports received in 
March 2006: 18,480 
Number of unique phishing sites received in March 
2006: 9666 
Number of brands hijacked by phishing campaigns in 
March 2006: 70 
Number of brands comprising the top 80% of 
phishing campaigns in March 2006: 3 
Country hosting the most phishing websites in March 
2006: United States 
Contain some form of target name in URL: 48.05 % 
No hostname, just IP address: 32 % 
Percentage of sites not using port 80: 3.9 % 
Average time online for site: 5.0 days 
Longest time online for site: 31 days 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Fig 4. Summary of March 2006 Phishing Report 
Findings [4] 
 
In March 2006, the Websense Security Labs reported 
that the United States was placed at the first spot in 
the list for hosting phishing sites, with a 35.13% 
share. 
Fig 5. The line graphs that show the phishing report 
counts and new phishing sites counts [4]. 
 
The rest of the top 10 countries with their 
percentage contribution were as follows: China 
with 11.93%, Korea with 8.85%, Germany with 
3.57%, Canada with 3.52%, Japan with 2.39%, 
Romania with 2.29%, Spain with 2.13%, Brazil 
with 1.97%, and Argentina with 1.92%. There was 
also a great increase in phishing based Trojans and 
keyloggers as shown in figure 6. The number of 
hijacked brand was also averaging around 91.23 
from March 2005 to March 2006, as depicted in 
figure 7 [4]. 
Fig 6. Line graph that show the phishing based 
Trojans and keyloggers counts [4] 
Fig 7. Line graph that shows the hijacked brand 
counts [4] 
 
To have a rough idea on identity theft in general, 
we took a closer look at the Consumer Fraud and 
Identity Theft Complaint Data (January-December 
2005). The report is registered by Federal Trade 
Commission (in the United States) and taken from 
the Consumer Sentinel and the Identity Theft Data 
Clearinghouse [5]. It gives details of identity thefts 
over the years 2003-2005. Checking against the 
reported amount paid by the consumers, the 
percentage of complaints reporting above $1000 
payments topped at 23%, close to a 10% increase 
against the complaints in 2003 and 2004. As for the 
methods of payments reported by the consumers, 
there has been a sound increase from 5% in 2003 to 
roughly 20% in 2005. The credit card method 
adopted cases top the list and keep a consistent 
40% over the 3 years. Coming to the question of 
which age group seems most vulnerable to the 
above fraud cases, the age group between 20-50 
years accounts for a total of 75% throughout the 
years, with each age group between 20-29 years, 30-
39 years and 40-49 years equally distributed among 
that 75%. As for the identity theft complaints, the age 
group between 18-30 years is the most victimized 
among the lot [5]. 
 
5. Countermeasures against Phishing Scam 
There are some steps that users or organizations can 
take when it comes to handling spam and phishing 
emails. Some general precautions that can be taken 
against phishing at a user level are as follows [6]: 
 
1. Within a phishing email, never click on 
hyperlinks, as they may not take the user to the right 
place. 
2. Use proper and updated security software – like 
antivirus software, anti-spam software and anti-
spyware software. Update the signatures of these 
software programs on a regular basis. This can 
harden the user computer against attacks. Even 
though anti-spam software may generate false 
alarms, it will be good to flag the suspicious emails 
and store them at some location (locally) for a quick 
review, rather than deleting them straightaway. Keep 
the browser and the operating system software 
updated with all the recent and critical security 
updates. A security update is released when there are 
critical security flaws that an attacker can utilize. 
3. Never download free software from unknown 
websites as some free software downloads come with 
hidden or embedded Trojans. 
4. Use a strong firewall, which is in-built in many 
operating systems nowadays. 
5. Look for “https” protocol in the address bar and 
the padlock symbol on the bottom status bar of the 
browser, before entering any personal information. 
6. Educate oneself of the fraudulent activities on the 
Internet and keep an updated knowledge of such 
happenings. 
7. Anti-Phising toolbars can be used along with the 
Internet browsers to identify phishing sites and warn 
the user as he or she browses, if the site is suspicious 
[7].  
 
There are some more detailed anti-phishing steps that 
an organization can consider. Some detailed 
countermeasures against phishing attack at an 
organization level are stated as follows [2], [8]: 
 
1. Email filtering can be a good option to tackle 
spam or phishing emails. As phishing emails are a 
subset of spam, good spam filters can help. Signature 
based anti-spam filters could prove to be useful too. 
To validate any anti-spam software installation, the 
following can be done. Arrangements need to be 
done to only tag the spam initially. This is the first 
stage of implementation. After successful tagging, 
the spam could be directed to some location (Junk 
Email Store) on E-mail server where it can be 
monitored on a weekly basis by the email 
administrator. The false positives, if any, could then 
be directed to the right person. This is the second 
stage of implementation. The flow chart of such an 
arrangement is shown in figure 8. 
 
Fig 8. The flow chart showing Email filtering 
implementation and its validation 
 
2. Email authentication can ensure that message is 
sent by the intended person who is the sender of the 
mail. The attacker normally forges the return 
address and would send email from a similar-
looking domain to that of an original domain. 
There are different approaches proposed for email 
authentication, as of now. Return address forgery 
can be tackled by Sender-ID and SPF by checking 
DNS records to ensure whether the IP address of 
the sending MTA (Mail Transfer Agent) is an 
authorized sender. Domain level cryptographic 
signatures can also be used to provide 
authentication through Domain keys by cross-
checking the DNS record. Cryptographically 
signed emails can be a good option especially if 
signing becomes a normal way of sending emails. 
Signing can be done either at the client machine or 
at the gateway. 
3. Patching the operating system for security 
vulnerabilities can be a hardening measure to 
withstand malicious software’s execution on user 
computer. Security updates when available can be 
downloaded to a local server and distributed 
through local area network. 
4. User education is an important step in thwarting 
phishing scams. Users need to be instructed not to 
click on links in an email and to ensure that SSL is 
being used for secure transactions on web pages. 
They should be instructed to always use expected 
domain name for logging in. Also, they should never 
give in to a call-to-action in any email that warns of 
negative consequences if they fail to follow the link. 
 
6. Multi-Layered Anti-Phishing Proposal 
In this section we would like to propose a multi-
layered approach to curb phishing emails. The 
approach is a combination of different technologies. 
The steps/stages can be combined in a suitable order 
into one anti-phishing solution which can be installed 
on the email server. A router based implementation 
of some modules is also a possibility. 
 
Step 1: White List and Black List Approach: 
Implement a white-list, which is a list of “fully 
permitted” email addresses. For example, in a big 
organization where the email users are using a client 
interface, they can be allowed to submit the .csv 
format of their address book (without unwanted 
entries) through a simple upload to email server, 
which updates the central white-list for the 
organization. Also, once a spam escapes and comes 
into a user’s mail box, through a one-button-press on 
email client, they should be able to report the mail as 
spam to their email server, which can improve the 
black-list entries. Their signatures can also be noted. 
When a reasonable number (say, n number) of people 
reports it as spam, the message can be marked as 
“spam” in users’ mailboxes so that it is not delivered 
to them again [2]. Black-listed email addresses will 
also be ranked based on how many people reported it 
as spam or phishing address. Provisions can be made 
to block addresses based on domain names. Also, 
have all previous phishing signatures stored in a 
central online database. Details like email address, IP 
address, subject details, random lines from messages 
and keywords can be stored too. The server should 
contain all the spoofed company’s original web 
pages that would be updated regularly. These web 
pages are used for layout and content comparison. 
All the entries in the database which are potential 
phishing sources are assigned a score, based on their 
frequency of being noted and caught. Their severity 
level would increase as the score increases. The setup 
is shown in figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 9. The White List/Black List with Online Server 
Step 2: Securing of SMTP Server: SMTP servers 
from registered static IP address only should be 
allowed. It should support SMTP user 
authentication and be standardized to work only in 
this way. No SMTP relays should be allowed. 
SMTP servers should not be allowed to run from a 
dynamic IP address, as phishers could run their 
own SMTP servers from dial-up connections. 
Optionally, digital signatures can be gradually 
made mandatory in emailing systems so that sender 
identity cannot be forged. This will prevent further 
email messages with spoofed sender addresses as 
such emails would be rejected. Only a valid sender 
can now send emails. 
 
Step 3: Implement Grey Listing: The Grey listing 
approach [9] proposed by Harris looks at three 
pieces of information that form a signature – the IP 
address of the host attempting the delivery, the 
envelope sender address and the envelope recipient 
address. If the receiving side has never seen this 
signature, the email would be rejected for the first 
time and it would become a bounced email. It 
would be allowed in only a second time (when the 
sender resends), after a delay of 25 minutes to 4 
hours. Generally, this would stop spam and 
phishing emails to a great extent, since spammers 
and phishers may not resend (most of the time) 
their emails with the same signature. Some fine-
tuning can be done to the above procedure by 
allowing a growing safe-list on the receiving email 
server that takes priority over grey listing. This can 
significantly reduce the bounced emails.  
 
Step 4: Webpage Layout Comparison: When a new 
phishing email arrives which is sent through a non-
spoofed email address, the web link in it would be 
compared with the web pages of known companies 
that are prone to spoofing (from past history), 
which are already stored in a central server 
database. The two web pages are checked for 
similarity on a 5-region wise comparison – south, 
north, west, east and center regions. Font attributes 
(like font type, style, size along with formatting 
attributes like bold, italics and underlining, etc.) 
and image related attributes (like image type, size, 
width, height, creation date, etc.) are checked in 
each region in both pages. If the comparison yields 
positive similarities result, the email would be 
accepted, otherwise the user is warned and the 
email’s signature will be stored in the central 
online server. Scores can be assigned to 
comparison variables used and a decision can be 
taken based on the cumulative score crossing a 
threshold value. A very similar approach has 
already been proposed by Wenyin et. al. [10].  
 
Step 5: Text Extraction from Image: When the 
email comes in with images as contents, the text in 
it would be extracted and used for lexical analysis 
using Bayesian filters (as in step 7), and the 
webpage that it is pointing to would be checked 
against a regular phishing email. Any discrepancy 
can thus be notified to the user and alerted to the 
central online server by storing its signature. 
 
Step 6: Matching DNS names: The web links in 
phishing emails are also checked for veracity with 
the original organizations web domain, through a 
DNS query. If it is a concocted website link and a 
domain (that has nothing to do with advertised 
organization), the link can immediately be notified to 
the user and the central server database can be 
updated with the details. For example, consider a 
phishing email with Citibank details, asking the user 
to click a web link to update Citibank account 
details. The first 2 octets in IP address of Citibank in 
decimal dot notation is 192.193 and this can be 
checked with the forged domain’s IP address. 
 
Step 7: Implementing Aggregate Bayesian Filters: 
Bayesian filtering [11], [12] works on the principle 
that the probability of an event occurring in the 
future can be inferred from the previous occurrences 
of that event. For example, if the word “sexy” occurs 
in 1000 out of 5000 spam emails and 100 out of 500 
legitimate emails, then the spam probability would 
be (1000/5000) / (1000/5000 + 100/500) = 0.5. Like 
spam filters, phishing emails can also be processed in 
the same way and be filtered through Bayesian filters 
using single keyword, 2-keyword or 3-keyword 
combinations. These can be three blocks with 
increasing priorities of scores and a weighted average 
score can be taken for labeling it as spam. This single 
keyword (say like – porn, horny), 2 keywords (like – 
porn site, horny wives) or 3 keywords (like – free 
porn site, sexy horny wives, etc.) self-learning filters 
can help to block suspicious spam emails. Keywords 
in subject line and content space can give different 
scores. Subject line keywords are crucial and will 
have high scores. Special characters (like $, -, *, 
digits 1-9, ‘, “, etc.) introduced by spammers to 
confuse spam filters can be extracted/removed or 
replaced (say, 0 with o) from keywords to improve 
filtering. If 2-keyword or 3-keyword combinations 
are not possible, only a single keyword will be 
considered and scored without weights. The score 
from 1-keyword block (i.e. score 1) has weight of X, 
the score from 2-keyword block (i.e. score 2) has 
weight of Y and the score from 3-keyword block (i.e. 
score 3) has weight of Z. We are proposing to take a 
weighted average (Wavg) which is given as follows: 
Wavg = (X*score 1 + Y*score 2 + Z*score 3)/3, 
where X < Y and Y < Z. The value of X, Y and Z 
have to be fine-tuned and the best possible values 
should be chosen. If there can only be single and 2-
keyword option, then different values of weights (X 
and Y, where X < Y) can be considered for their 
respective scores. A threshold value can be set and 
emails with weighted average values above the 
threshold will be tagged, quarantined or rejected. The 
same technology can be extended to phishing emails 
– with phishing related keywords (see figure 10 for 
details). 
Fig 10. The aggregate Bayesian filtering approach 
 
The above stages once combined, can be tested for  
accuracy of the phishing email filtering by initially 
tagging the phishing emails, as explained in figure 
8. Threshold values can also be fine tuned in 
different stages. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed the various aspects 
of phishing attacks both in theory as well as in 
practice. We briefly presented some commonly 
seen attacks related to today’s business world and 
showed some corresponding defenses to counter 
those attacks. We have also highlighted some 
recent statistical results to project the growing 
problem of the phishing spam. We reckon that 
online security threats are nothing new, and 
business has to cope with various types of 
emerging threats since the beginning of e-
commerce. As business practices evolve to keep 
pace with the advancement of new technology, 
fraudulent practices also become accustomed to the 
new technological opportunities that present 
themselves. Hence, our paper proposed an anti-
phishing proposal in the hope that many identity 
theft disasters could be avoided through creating a 
better understanding of the Internet frauds in 
general and phishing in particular. 
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